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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we evaluate generational incidence and sustainability of fiscal policy using 
the method of generational accounting (GA). Our attention is in the relative importance of 
earnings related pension on sustainability of public finances. 
We perform two sustainability calculations. Assuming the current structure of public 
income and expenditure, the sustainability gap in public finances, measured as a need to 
increase the overall tax rate, is estimated to be 7.2 per cent of GDP, when future taxes and 
benefits are discounted by a 3.5 per cent interest rate. Due to the 2005 pension reform and 
recent labor market agreements, both contribution and benefit structures are changing. Using 
actuarial estimates of the impacts of the pension reform, the sustainability gap diminishes to 
5.8 per cent of GDP. Using an alternative discount rate of 5 per cent, the respective figures 
would be 4.6 and 3.6 per cent.
The contribution of earnings-related pensions to the sustainability of public finances, 
assuming the current structure of benefits, is 1.1 per cent relative to GDP. Using actuarial 
estimates of pension expenditures, we find out that the pension system as a whole has a 
positive contribution to the sustainability of public finances, which is 0.3 per cent relative to 
GDP. A significant proportion of the difference compared to a status quo calculation is due 
to the automatic adjustment as a result of the life expectancy coefficient that is reflected only 
in actuarial calculations. The diminishing size of public sector pensions liabilities is another 
major reason.
JEL Classification: H6, E6
Keywords: generational accounting, fiscal sustainability, public finances, taxes, public 
transfers 
ABSTRAKTI
Tässä tutkimuksessa arvioimme finanssipolitiikan kestävyyttä ja kohdentumista 
ikäryhmiin sukupolvitilinpidon menetelmällä. Erityinen mielenkiintomme kohdistuu 
työeläkejärjestelmän merkitykseen julkisen talouden kestävyydelle. 
Teemme kaksi kestävyyslaskelmaa. Olettamalla nykyinen verojen ja tulonsiirtojen 
rakenne kestävyysvaje, mitattuna yleisenä veronkorotustarpeena, on tutkimuksessa 
arvioitu 7.2 prosentiksi suhteessa bkt:een kun tulevaisuuden etuuksien ja verojen nykyarvo 
on laskettu 3.5 prosentin diskonttokorolla. Vuoden 2005 työeläkeuudistuksen sekä 
viimeaikaisten työmarkkinasopimusten vuoksi sekä maksujen että etuuksien rakenne 
eläkejärjestelmässä muuttuu. Aktuaaristen arvioiden käyttäminen tulevien maksujen ja 
etuuksien tasosta työeläkejärjestelmässä alentaa arviota kestävyysvajeesta 5.8 prosenttiin 
bkt:sta. Vastaavat luvut ovat 4.6 ja 3.6 prosenttia, jos nykyarvojen laskennassa käytetään 
vaihtoehtoisen diskottotekijänä 5 prosentin korkoa. 
Olettamalla nykyisen etuuksien rakenteen eläkejärjestelmän merkitys kestävyysvajeeseen 
olisi 1.1prosenttia bkt:sta. Käyttämällä aktuaarisia arvioita tulevista etuuksien ja 
maksujen tasosta osoittautuu että työeläkejärjestelmällä on positiivinen vaikutus julkisen 
talouden rahoitukselliseen kestävyyteen. Se on suuruudeltaan 0.3 prosenttia suhteutettuna 
bkt:een. Merkittävä osa erosta ’status quo’ -laskelmaan selittyy elinaikakertoimella, joka 
automaattisesti vakauttaa eläkemenoja suhteessa eliniän kasvuun. Tämä on huomioitu 
vain aktuaarisessa laskelmassa. Toinen merkittävä tekijä on julkisen sektorin tulevien 
eläkevastuiden huomattava alenema.
JEL luokat: H6, E6
Asiasanat: sukupolvitilinpito,julkisen talouden kestävyys,julkisen talouden rahoitus  public 
finances, verot julkiset tulonsiirrot 
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1 Introduction
A distinguishing feature of Finnish society is that the baby-boom generations are 
exceptionally large. Finland has already entered the stage of demographic transition where 
the share of the working-age population is declining because of the population ageing. This 
is expected to continue at an accelerating rate during the next two decades.
Traditional fiscal indicators on current debt and deficits are not able to track how 
maintaining the current fiscal stance will affect particular generations, nor can they account 
for the effects of changing demographic structures. Generational accounting (GA), developed 
by Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff (1991), is a method that addresses these questions. It 
projects the net tax burdens of future years on different age groups and, consequently, on 
the remaining life cycle of present generations and on the life cycle of future generations. 
The method provides information on anticipated tensions in future public finances by 
taking into account expected changes in future expenses due to changes in demography. By 
accommodating these changes, the method provides an informative tool for assessing the 
lifetime impact of government policy on different age groups.
Unlike the case in most countries, the public sector in Finland has positive net financial 
wealth. This is because of partially-funded statutory employment pension insurance, 
compulsory for all employers and employees as well as for the self-employed. The market 
value of pension fund assets fell sharply due to the financial and economic crisis. It was 
around 77 per cent of GDP at the end of 2010 and 72 per cent in 2011.
In the generational accounts, we pay attention to the additional strain that the financial 
crisis imposes on the long-term sustainability of public finances. Our particular attention 
lies in the rapid deterioration of the old-age dependency ratio and the relative importance of 
earnings-related pensions for the sustainability of public finances. 
This paper is structured in the following way: Section 2 presents the structure of public 
finances in Finland and discusses shortly the impact of the financial crisis on public wealth. 
Section 3 briefly introduces the Finnish pension system and its particular role in public 
finances. Section 4 outlines the fairly well-known method of generational accounts and 
reviews a recently introduced method to make business cycle adjustments to the revenue and 
expenditure levels. Section 5 presents population prospects and discusses their implications 
for the sustainability of public finances. In that section, we also study the separate impacts of 
earnings-related pensions relative to other net transfers of general government on the long-
term sustainability of fiscal policy in Finland. Concluding remarks are made in section 6.
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2 Structure of public finances in Finland
The public sector holds a substantial role in the intergenerational distribution in Finland. 
Table 1 presents the balance of expenditures and receipts of the general government in 
20111. The general government consists of the central government, local government units 
(municipalities) and social security funds. Age-related public consumption, consisting of 
education, health and social care, was more than 14 per cent of GDP. The responsibility for 
the provision of most of these services rests with the municipalities. They have the authority 
to collect taxes to fund the services, but they also receive state subsidies to enable them to 
arrange the services they are required to provide. Age profiles for education and health care 
are estimated based on the Household Budget Survey 2006 while the age profiles for social 
care are based on estimates made by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health (2006). A 
large share of the customers of social care are people in institutions who are not included in 
the household surveys.
Table 1.
General government expenditures and receipts by type in 2011 (% of GDP).
Expenditure Receipts
Family policy cash transfers 1.6
Income taxes on wages, social security  
benefits and capital income
12.5
Sickness daily allowance 0.7
Contributions to the statutory earnings- 
related pension scheme
9.5
Unemployment insurance benefits 1.6
Contributions to other social insurance  
schemes
2.7
Statutory earnings-related pension  
benefits
10.7 Indirect taxes 14.0
Other  pension benefits 1.6 Corporate taxes 2.6
Other individual cash transfers 1.4 Capital taxes 1.2
Subsidies 1.4 Other taxes 0.1
Other cash transfers (net) 2.9 Property income 6.2
Health care 5.9 Deficit 0.8
Education 4.6
Social care 3.9
Other individual, collective, or public 
consumption
10.0
Property expenditure 3.6
Total expenditures 49.8 Total receipts 49.8
Sources: Statistics Finland, Finnish Centre for Pensions, Social Insurance Institution of Finland, Financial Supervisory 
Authority.
1   Based on data released on July 12, 2012.
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The total volume of public cash transfers was about 22 per cent of GDP. About 85 per cent 
of these transfers could be assigned to specific ages. Public pension expenditure represented 
more than half of the total volume of public transfers. Other transfers with an age pattern are 
family-related benefits such as parenthood and child allowances, unemployment benefits, 
health insurance daily allowances, the student allowance, the housing allowance, and social 
assistance for poor households. The age profiles for these transfers are derived from Income 
distributions statistics 2009. The age distribution of public services and transfers by 5-year 
age groups are presented in the appended Table A1.
The total tax revenue in 2011 was 42.8 per cent of GDP. The central government receives 
more than half of the total tax revenues. Local governments (municipalities) and statutory 
pension insurance providers each collect one fifth of the tax revenues. The Social Insurance 
Institution of Finland and unemployment insurance funds are also minor tax collectors. The 
central government gives financial support to all other tax-collecting sectors. 
The bulk of taxation in Finland is derived from taxes on income, profits and capital 
gains, on the one hand, and taxes on goods and services, on the other. Combined, they count 
for 71.3 per cent of tax revenues. In 2011, the former category accounted for 38.5 per cent 
of the total taxation and the latter for 32.8 per cent. 
In 2011 total receipts collected by the general government got short of the expenditure 
and the public sector is running a deficit that was 0.8 per cent relative to GDP. In this 
respect, sub-sectors of the general government have different stances. During recent years, 
the central government has run deficits, local governments have been mainly in balance and 
earnings-related pension schemes have run surpluses. 
Earnings-related taxes are strongly age-related. Taxes on wage earnings mirror the 
pattern that reflects the higher productivity of older workers because of accumulated human 
capital and work experience. Lower participation rates in the young and the old spectrum of 
the working-age population also have an impact on the age dependency of income taxes (see 
Vaittinen and Vanne 2006). 
The main consumption tax is the value-added tax. Also excise taxes are levied on 
alcoholic beverages, tobacco, energy products, and cars. Age-specific consumption patterns 
have implications for the tax burden over different generations. Younger and middle-aged 
people tend to consume more alcohol, tobacco, and transport-related goods than do older 
people. These items are heavily taxed by excise duties. In addition, the relative amount of 
the consumption of goods that are taxed at lower-than-average value-added rates, such as 
food and health care, increases with age. The age pattern of consumption taxes has been 
estimated based on the Household Budget Survey 2006 (see Vaittinen - Vanne, 2006 and 
2010).
A further major source of tax revenue was the social security contributions paid by 
employers to the Social Insurance Institution of Finland and payments to the pension funds 
or pension insurance companies. The Finnish pension system is based almost exclusively on 
statutory and compulsory pension schemes, which are a mixture of a basic public pension 
scheme and employment-based pension insurance. Tax revenues by main tax categories in 
5-year age groups are presented in the appended Table A1.
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Based on these several national data sources figure 1 gives an aggregate overview 
of taxes and benefits by age. Pensions are presented as a separate item in addition to all 
benefits. Currently, mid-aged generations are net payers of public transfers. People in their 
mid-ages are at the most productive phase of their life-cycle. They earn and consume more 
in per capita terms than do other cohorts and also pay a proportionally larger share of taxes. 
People at this stage of life use relatively little public resources or transfers. 
Figure 1.
Per capita taxes and public transfers and services by age in 2011.
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Looking at the gross-section of taxes and benefits by age in year 2011, generations younger 
than 25 and older than 62 years are net recipients of public transfers. These generations 
receive more resources, either as public services or transfers, than they pay in taxes or social 
security contributions.
The volume of public benefits and the share of services or transfers vary significantly 
along the life-span. Public resources are most intensively needed at very old ages. In 
per capita terms, the total value of public transfers exceeds EUR 40,000 per year for the 
population aged above 85. The volume is below EUR 10,000 between the ages of 25 and 
55 years and during some years before starting school. For young people, child care and 
education raise the level of public benefits.
Financial crisis and public finances
One of the sustainability indicators of EU's growth and stability pact is the budget deficit 
of the general government. It consists of the central government, the local governments and 
social security institutions, including pension insurers. In Figure 2, the solid line depicts the 
development of the general government deficit during the euro era. This is broken down to 
contributions of social security institutions (light bar) and an aggregate of local and central 
governments (dark bar). 
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Figure 2.
General government deficit (-) relative to GDP by public institutions.
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In Finland the finances of the general government have been in surplus for most of the euro 
era. The years following the financial crisis in 2008 make the only exception. The deficit, 
however, does not exceed the 3 per cent limit agreed in the stability and growth pact. 
By looking at the sub-sectors one finds out that the central and local governments 
have been roughly in balance and social security institutions have been running significant 
surpluses, on average close to four per cent of GDP, before the financial crisis. After the 
crisis, the overall deficit has stayed below the growth and stability pact criteria because of 
the surplus in social security institutions. The deficit increased significantly in the rest of 
the public sector because of revenue losses due to the declining economic activity and fiscal 
policy accommodating the business cycle (OECD, 2010)
The observed patterns in public deficits are reflected in the accumulated wealth of the 
public sector. Table 2 reviews the development of public gross and net wealth by different 
subsectors. The general government gross debt is a consolidated figure subtracting cross 
ownership of liabilities with sub-sectors. This indicator is specified in the Stability and 
Growth Pact legislation as another criterion to monitor excessive budgetary deficits. 
However, the criterion takes into account only the financial liabilities but not the assets 
owned by the public sector. The row below Gross Debt in Table 2 describes net financial 
wealth, which is the difference between the assets and liabilities of the general government.
 
12 FINNISH CENTRE FOR PENSIONS, WORKING PAPERS
Table 2.
Financial wealth of the public sector.
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Consolidated Gross Debt 35.2 33.9 43.5 48.6 49.0
Net financial wealth 
General government
 
73.1 53.5 65.4 67.0 55.6
         Net financial wealth 68.1 56.6 72.5 77.3 72.0
        Pension institutions
         Net financial wealth 5.1 -3.1 -7.1 -10.3 -16.4
         Other sub-sectors 
Source: National account statistics, 2012.
The general government owned assets equaling the size of GDP in 2007. Taking into account 
the gross debt, net financial wealth turned out to be 73 percent relative to gross domestic 
output. Most of the net wealth was possessed by pension insurance institutions, but also 
central and local governments owned assets that exceeded their liabilities. Financial crisis 
did reverse the asset liability balance in other than pension insurance sectors of the general 
government. In 2008, the decline in net wealth is due to the financial crises that had an 
adverse impact on asset values across all sub-sectors. The asset prices revived in 2009 and 
in 2010, following another year of low performance in 2011. With a lag, the financial market 
crisis led to a decline in economic activity, followed by a recession and a public debt crisis 
in high-income countries throughout the world. 
The net wealth position of the Finnish public sector has also deteriorated because of 
increased deficits in the central and local government sectors. However, the situation is, in 
general, much less severe than it is in almost any other high-income nation. In 2010, there 
were only seven OECD countries with positive public sector net wealth. Relative to GDP, 
Finland had the second highest figure after Norway (OECD, 2011). 
Asset allocation of public wealth
Figure 3 shows the portfolio of the net financial wealth of the general government 
decomposed to the contributions of pension insurers and the rest of the public sector. The 
figure shows that the net fixed income instrument position of the general government is 
nearly zero and the net assets are more risky than, for example, government bonds. However, 
one could expect that, in the future, the deficits and surpluses will be cumulated in the form 
of bonds, holding the share of other asset classes constant.
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Figure 3.
 Allocation and expected real rate of return of general government net wealth. 
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Using the current allocation weights of four assets categories, the expected rate of return has 
been calculated for the general government and pension insurers’ wealth separately. In the 
calculation of the expected returns for alternative asset allocations, global averages for the 
short- and long-term bond yields reported in Kahra (2009) are used. A consensus estimate 
of 3 per cent for a risk premium (Kahra, p. 147) on stocks and other high risk instruments 
is used. The annual expected return for short term bonds is 1 per cent, for long term bonds 
2 per cent, for real estate 4 per cent and 5 per cent for stocks and other high risk assets for 
general government wealth. Using the observed asset allocations they imply the expected 
returns of 4.8 per cent for general government and 3.3 per cent for pension insurers’ wealth. 
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3 Partial funding of earnings-related pensions
Public pension expenditure represented more than half of the total volume of public 
transfers. Finnish statutory pensions are made up of partly-funded earnings-related pensions 
and national pensions. Private voluntary pensions play a relatively minor role in the total 
pension provision. Earnings-related pensions are defined-benefit in the sense that the size of 
the pension expenditure determines the contribution level and the need for other financing. 
Since the 2005 pension reform, the rules for public and private sector employees have been 
almost identical, though with a significant transition period because the rules for public-
sector pensions prior to 2005 were more generous than in the private sector.
Benefits
The earnings-related pension scheme consists of several pension acts, which together 
cover the different sectors of the economy. The most important of these are the Employees 
Pensions Act, the State Employees’ Pensions Act, and the Local Government Pensions Act. 
In practice, all wage income by employees and self-employed aged 18-67 is insured by 
some pension act. Earnings-related pension benefits include old-age, disability, survivor and 
part-time pension benefits. 
At present, earnings-related pension accrues from earnings between the ages of 18 and 
67. The insured is entitled to a normal old-age pension at the age of 63, but he or she can 
continue to work up to the age of 68 at an increased accrual rate. The national pension 
guarantees a minimum income for pension recipients with no other pension income or with 
only a small earnings-related pension. 
Financing pensions
Currently, the Finnish earnings-related pension scheme is a partially-funded scheme with 
about EUR 140 billion worth of assets, that is, about 1.9 times the insured wage sum. About 
67 per cent of these assets are owned by private-sector pension providers. Funds are invested 
both domestically and internationally in commercial assets. 
As opposed to many other schemes, the funds in the Finnish scheme are not individualized 
at employee level. The amount of funding in the private sector is linked to each individual 
in order to determine the liability of each pension provider, and the funds are used to pay the 
specific individual’s pension once he or she retires. Yet it is not individualized in the sense 
that an employee would be able to differentiate the funded part from the pay-as-you-go 
part or, even closer, to individual accounts in the Anglo-Saxon sense. Pension expenditure 
for self-employed persons and for farmers is financed through the annual premium income 
and the State’s share. The State’s share is the part of the pension expenditure which is not 
covered by premium income. In practice, it is covered by general tax collection. 
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The state and local government pension schemes were originally based on a pure pay-as-
you-go system. Keva (formerly the Local Government Pensions Institution) started funding 
pensions in 1988 in order to curb the increase in pension contributions. The State Pension 
Fund was established in 1990 to prepare for the State’s future pension expenditures. The aim 
of this fund is to gather assets so that the cost burden caused by the pensions of the post-war 
baby-boomers can be lessened in the years when the pension expenditure is at its highest. 
National pensions are completely financed on a pay-as-you-go basis.
Pension Reform in 2005
The 2005 pension reform profoundly altered the Finnish earnings-related pension system. 
The main motivating factor in the reform was to improve the long-term sustainability of the 
system. The reform restricted access to early retirement: the unemployment pension was 
abolished for persons born in 1950 or later, part-time pension was made less attractive by 
reducing the accrual rate and increasing the eligibility age. The level of prefunding for the 
benefit obligations was improved. Most importantly, old-age and survivors’ benefits were 
linked to increasing longevity through the life-expectancy coefficient. 
The initial amount of old-age pension is adjusted to account for the change in longevity 
for 62-year-olds through the life expectancy coefficient. The coefficient is determined to 
keep the capital value of the old-age pension unchanged when the life expectancy for persons 
at retirement age changes in comparison to the expectancy calculated based on statistics for 
2003–2007 as a reference value. The coefficient was 1.00 in 2010. According to the latest 
forecast by Statistics Finland (OSF, 2009), it is projected to be 0.91 in 2025 and 0.81 in 2050 
(see Risku et al., 2012 p. 77). 
Financial crisis 
The global financial markets faced a crisis in 2008, causing earnings-related pension 
investments to suffer a loss of 18 per cent in real terms. The development in the following 
two years has more-or-less compensated the losses experienced in 2008.
The growth in gross domestic product slowed down to 1 per cent per year in 2008, 
compared to the high figure of 5.5 per cent in 2007. The consequences of the financial crisis 
for the economic activity manifested themselves a year later. In 2009, GDP was reduced 
by 8.2 per cent and the recovery since then has been modest. The level of GDP achieved in 
2008 is expected to be reached at the earliest in 2014.
The reduction in the value of pension assets, along with the reduced wage sum, 
increases the pressure to raise the earnings-related pension contribution. However, pension 
expenditure will not grow significantly due to the recession. In short, the recession will 
increase pension expenditure if the number of retirees increases as a result of the weak 
employment development. On the other hand, the poor development in labor markets will 
reduce the amount of accrued pensions and thus reduce future pension expenditure.
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4 Generational accounts and fiscal imbalance
The generational account (GA) for a cohort is the present value of net tax that the cohort 
pays over its whole life (its “tax burden”). The account evaluated at year t for the cohort 
born in year k is as follows:
(1) 
 ( )
, , ,
max( , )
(1 )
k D
s t
t k s k s k
s t k
N T P r

− −

 ∑  
where Ts,k stands for the projected average net tax payments to the government made in year 
s by the generation born in year k. The term Ps,k stands for the number of surviving members 
of the cohort in year s who were born in year k. D is the maximum length of life and r is the 
annual discount rate. 
Inter-temporal budget of the government
A set of generational accounts is simply a set of values of Nt,k, one for each existing and 
future generation. The computation of the GAs starts with the following inter-temporal 
budget of the government:
(2)  
( ) ( )
, ,
1
(1 ) (1 )
t
k t s t g
t k t k s t
k t D k t s t
N N r G r W
∞ ∞
− − − −
 −   
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in which the left hand side are the generational accounts split between the living and future 
generations (as above). The second term on the left hand side is an infinite sum, but with 
ordinary assumptions about the interest and growth rates, it would converge to a finite 
number. Gs is government non age-related consumption and gtW  is government net wealth. 
Generational accounts indicate counterfactual lifetime tax burdens conditional on the 
perpetuation of current fiscal policy parameters. Particularly, it maintains the original 
age incidence of tax payments, transfers receipts, and projects it into the future, using 
demographic forecasts. Generational accounting formulates the inter-temporal budget 
net deficit as the aggregate of the present value of current and future primary net deficits, 
associated with present fiscal policy decisions made by the government. This benchmark 
matches the inter-temporal perspective of economic agents as life-cycle planners.
Equation (2) indicates the zero sum nature of intergenerational fiscal policy. Holding the 
present value of government non-age-related consumption fixed, a reduction in the present 
value of net taxes extracted from current generations (a decline in the first summation on the 
left side of (2)) necessitates an increase in the present value of net tax payments of future 
generations.
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Projecting future taxes and benefits
In equation (1), net taxes are described as scalar variables for a given age and time. In 
practice, the age profiles of different types of benefits and taxes differ greatly from each 
other 2. In the baseline, projecting the future values of net taxes, we follow the standard 
practice of generational accounting as in Raffelhüschen (1999). 
Let  i kte ,  and  
j
kt ,τ  be per capita benefits of type i and taxes of type j for age group k in base 
year t, then benefits and taxes in year s>t are calculated as follows:
(3)  
j
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g
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in which g stands for the long term annual productivity growth rate. Using the observed age 
profiles as a basis for the future reflects the assumptions of the prevailing current policy. 
Sustainability indicator for fiscal policy
Using equations (1) - (3), inter-temporal public net liabilities can be defined as: 
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We define our sustainability indicator by solving the coefficient for taxes that sets the future 
net liabilities as zero (Lt=0).
Business cycle correction
In general, the government tax revenue increases and transfer spending falls during an 
economic boom, whereas the opposite happens during a recession. As a consequence, fiscal 
policy might appear more or less sustainable, depending on the macroeconomic stance in the 
base period of the projection. Bonin and Patxot (2010) have noted that the main limitations 
of GA as a sustainability indicator is that it tends to perpetuate the initial business cycle 
conditions reflected both in primary surplus and net taxes.
Considering public-sector net liabilities, it is obvious that constant growth updating 
according to (3) perpetuates not only initial fiscal policy parameter, but also the initial 
economic conditions, to the extent that primary imbalance for constant fiscal policy vary 
2   The related statistics come from different sources (see Vaittinen and Vanne, 2006).
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over the business cycle. Accordingly, life-time net tax burdens measured by the generational 
accounts and the sustainability gap develop pro-cyclically. 
In this study, we use cyclically adjusted revenues R* and expenditures E*:
(5)   
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where actual revenues and expenditures deviate from the potential output level values as 
follows:
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We have calculated cyclically adjusted revenues and expenditures using sensitivity 
parameters (εj,ηj ) estimated for Finland by Girouard and Christophe (2005). The estimate 
for the output gap in 2011 for Finland is taken from IMF (2011).
Future policies and net taxes
It is important to acknowledge the indicative nature of net tax burdens measured by 
generational accounts (Bonin and Patxot, 2004). The method deliberately avoids a decision, 
by any means arbitrary, about when and how decision-makers would react to fiscal 
imbalances. Generational accounts indicate the overall long-term imbalance in fiscal policy 
but make no forecast of future adjustments to that policy. 
If policy measures which have already taken place change the values of expected 
taxes and benefits, it is reasonable to depart from the business-as-usual approach. Several 
discretionary measures to increase general government tax revenue have taken place that can 
be included in the generational accounts. It has been agreed that social security contributions 
will be increased by 1.6 per cent relative to the insured wage sum in 2012–2016 in order 
to finance the growth of pension expenditure. Energy and other indirect taxes have already 
been increased and a 1 per cent overall hike to value added tax has been agreed. We have 
included the revenue estimates of the Ministry of Finance (Economic Outlook ,p. 76) to our 
GA calculations to characterize the fiscal stance.
In this study, we have calculated net taxes based on two alternative sets of projections 
on statutory earnings-related pension benefits and contributions. The first set follows 
standard GA methodology using equation (3). The second set uses information produced 
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by the actuarial model of the Finnish Centre for Pensions, which simulates the operation 
of the pension schemes stated by current law. The model consists of several interconnected 
modules that use information of population and employment forecasts together with 
judgements about earnings and asset yields to project development of pension expenditures 
and contributions compatible with current legislation. Unlike the standard GA approach, 
it takes into account in a proper way the implications of productivity growth to benefit 
indexation and the automatic adjustment of benefits to incorporate growth in the expected 
lifetime (Risku et al., 2012). 
Discounting, primary balances and public asset allocation
It is rather common that the net wealth of a country’s general government is equal or almost 
equal to its debt, i.e. negative. In that case, the ‘natural’ discounting factor is the one derived 
from the interest rate on the public debt. The primary balances of the country may show 
surpluses or deficits in the future, but its net financial wealth allocation remains the same, as 
well as the discount factor. We disregard here, for example, the effects of over-indebtedness.
The above simple reasoning is ill-suited to Finland. The net asset allocation of the 
general government includes all asset classes, and non-zero primary balances constantly 
change the allocation. Expected returns are specific to asset classes, and the discounting 
factor varies respectively over time.
However, at any point in time, the prevailing allocation can be used as a basis for the 
discounting factor. The resulting net present value of public liabilities is correct, if we 
assume that asset allocation is always rebalanced to the starting level in the future. The 
value of net public wealth changes over time due to non-zero primary balances, but shares 
of different assets in the portfolio are assumed to be kept constant. This assumption may 
be unrealistic in practice. If the allocation changes in the future, we have to change the 
discounting factor in the calculations to be made at future points in time. We do not deal here 
with the time inconsistency between calculations made at different points in time, although 
we can already now almost certainly state the inconsistency.
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5 Population prospects, pensions and sustainability of 
 public finances
A distinguishing feature of the Finnish demography is exceptionally large baby-boom 
generations. Finland has also entered the stage of demographic transition where the share of 
the working-age population is declining because of the population ageing. This is expected 
to continue at an accelerating rate over the next decades.
To assess the impact of the future demographic change to public finances, we use the 
population forecast of Statistics Finland (OFS 2009) until 2060. This forecast assumes that 
the total fertility rate is 1.85, net migration is 15,000 persons per year (circa 0.28% of the 
population), and that the observed decrease in mortality in 1989-2008 will continue in the 
future. Risku et. al (2012) have extended the forecast from 2060 onwards to 2100 as such, 
except that from 2060, the rate of decrease in mortality is expected to be halved. 
Figure 4.
 Population by Age in Finland in 2011, 2030 and 2100.
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Figure 4 demonstrates the dramatic change in age distribution by comparing the population 
by age in 2011 and in two future years: 2030 and 2100. The size of the population remains 
relatively stable at the young end of net recipients of public transfers. This is also the case 
for net tax payers. The tail at the old end of net recipients increases drastically. At present, 
the share of the population above 65 years relative to those at working age (15-64 years) is 
27 per cent. It is expected to increase to 44 per cent in 2030 and 56 per cent at the end of this 
century. The same shares of those over 85 years are 3 per cent, 7 per cent and 17 per cent, 
respectively. The population projection by 5-year age groups is presented in the appended 
Table A2.
Figure 5 demonstrates the consequences of demographic change on public finances 
by presenting cyclically adjusted deficits in 2015, 2030 and 2100. Population prospects of 
Figure 4 are combined with age-dependent public receipts and revenues as presented in 
Figure 1. In the calculation of future balances, known decisions (Ministry of Finance, 2012) 
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on revenues and expenditures have been taken into account as well as the impact of the 
business cycle on the fiscal stance (IMF, 2012). The deterioration of the primary balance in 
Figure 5 reflects only a change in demography. Initially, the primary balance has a moderate 
deficit of 1.1 per cent relative to GDP. The age pattern in the deficit is such that the old age 
deficit is 4.0 percentage points larger than the young age deficit.  The old age deficit tends to 
be higher because of ageing by 3.7 percentage points relative to GDP in 2030 compared to 
2015. The overall deficit is 5.5 per cent of GDP because of a small (-1.0%) deterioration in 
the working age surplus, with the young age deficit remaining close to its 2015 value.
Figure 5.
Demography and primary balance. 
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The primary deficit continues to deteriorate towards the end of the century because of the 
growing population at old-age deficit ages, with the annual deficit being almost 10 per cent 
of GDP. Given the projected population prospect, the current fiscal stance with age-related 
expenditures and revenues would not be sustainable. 
Projections
In projecting future benefits and taxes, we have used a 1.6 per cent annual productivity as 
the compounding factor on the standard scenario and a 5 per cent interest rate to discount the 
present values of net benefits. The 5 per cent interest rate is motivated by the fact that public 
sector net wealth consists almost exclusively of stocks and high-risk assets. The long-term 
expected rate of return in these assets is estimated to be close to the figure we use (Kahra, 
2009). 
The business-as-usual approach to project future public revenues and expenditures per 
capita is to compound existing benefits by productivity growth rate. If policy measures which 
already have taken place change the values of expected taxes and benefits, it is reasonable to 
depart from the business-as-usual approach. In this study, we have calculated the indicators 
based on two alternative sets of statutory earnings-related pension benefits and contribution 
projections. 
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As an alternative, for a mechanical projection of earnings-related pension contributions 
and benefits, we use results from the latest long term projections of statutory pensions 
provided by the actuarial simulation model of the Finnish Centre for Pensions (Risku et 
al., 2012). These simulations take into account the gradual phasing in of the features in the 
2005 pension reform. In this study, the allocation of pension wealth gives an expected return 
of 3.5 per cent, which is used to discount future pension contributions and expenditures 
produced by the simulations. 
As already noted, government tax revenues increase and transfer spending falls during 
an economic boom, whereas the opposite happens during a recession. Fiscal policy appears 
more or less sustainable, depending on the macroeconomic balance in the base period of the 
projection, because life-time net tax burdens measured by the generational accounts and the 
sustainability gap develop pro-cyclically. For this reason, sustainability gaps are calculated 
using cyclically adjusted revenues and expenditures.  
Sustainability gaps
In assessing the sustainability of public finances, with the prospective of deterioration of 
old-age dependency, we evaluate separately the importance of the earnings-related pension 
system to the overall sustainability of public finances. To do this, we have to break up public 
net wealth to assets owned by pension insurers and the rest of the public sector. We have also 
subtracted the contributions of pension insurers to aggregate primary deficit.
Pension contributions of currently large working-age cohorts are partially funded. For 
this reason, the current contributions of insured wages to the pension schemes are larger than 
benefits paid out of these schemes. The primary balance and net lending of these schemes 
are positive. The remaining public benefits are on a pay-as-you-go basis and are initially in 
deficit.
Ageing has a profound impact on the sustainability of public finances. The expected 
change in the population structure widens the sustainability gap to 7.2 per cent or 4.6 per 
cent relative to GDP, depending on the discount rate used with conventional GA calculations. 
In this setting, also pension schemes have a sustainability gap with a lower discount rate.
Table 3.
Implicit debt and sustainability gaps (% of GDP).
Implicit debt - 
Standard GA1
Implicit debt - 
Actuarial pension 
projections
Sustainability gap 
- Standard GA1
Sustainability gap 
- Actuarial pension 
projections
Discount rate 3.5 5.0 3.5 5.0 3.5 5.0 3.5 5.0
General gov't less 
pension schemes
421 165 421 165 6.1 5.1 6.1 5.1
Earnings related 
pension schemes
67 -15 -30 -56 1.1 -0.5 -0.3 -1.5
General gov't total 431 150 391 109 7.2 4.6 5.8 3.6
1All benefits determined similarly. 
2Pension benefits calculated using actuarial model (Risku et al, 2012).
Earnings profiles of Finnish wage earners in 2000–2010 23
The mechanical projection is not able to take into account the population-driven breaks 
in benefit accrual or the actual indexation of pension benefits. Taking these into account, 
as in Risku et al. (2012), it turns out that the contribution of the statutory pension system 
has a moderately negative impact (around -0.3% or -1.5%) on the sustainability gap for 
Finnish public finances, implying a 5.8 and 3.6 per cent sustainability gap for the general 
government. 
The difference between mechanical GA calculation and actuarial calculations is mainly 
explained by two features in the pension system. The most significant factor controlling 
pension expenditures is the life-expectancy coefficient introduced in connection with the 
pension reform in 2005. It adjusts the magnitude of old-age pensions to the change in life-
expectancy for those aged 62 years. The second important factor is indexation. Implicitly, 
standard GA calculation assumes wage-indexation of the benefits, but within current 
practices, pensions are only partially indexed to real wage growth.
Risku et al. (2012) show that there is a pressure to increase the contribution rate in the 
private-sector earnings-related pension scheme. However, things are different in the public-
sector schemes. The structural changes in the labor markets and the effects of pension 
reforms on prospective replacement rates for the public-sector pensioners makes the current 
contributions to public-sector pension schemes more than sufficient in the future. This 
relation is concurrent with the fact that, at present, the contribution rates are clearly higher in 
the public-sector employees’ schemes compared to rates of the private sector schemes. The 
agreed hikes on employees’ contribution rates in 2012 – 2016, improves also the financial 
balance in public pensions.  
In fact, given the expected liabilities, the possibility to decrease contributions, and not to 
risk the financial balance, in the public sector more than compensates the need to increase 
them in the private sector. Since the accrued benefits are practically identical in both private 
and public earnings-related schemes, we can say that the currently existing structure in 
determining the benefits is maintainable at existing relative costs. 
Harmonizing the debt burden in the euro zone
We are not making conjectures about the institutional arrangements to public finances 
within the euro zone that might emerge as a consequence of the present financial crisis. To 
demonstrate implications of one possible outcome in the GA framework, we have calculated 
the sustainable tax increases that a debt harmonization to the average euro-zone level in 
Finland would imply. 
By financial co-responsibility we mean harmonization of debt levels within the euro 
zone. In the Finnish case, this is operationalized by assuming convergence of the gross debt 
to the average European level for the general government, excluding the pension schemes. 
The average public debt was about 100 per cent of GDP in 2010. Harmonization of Finnish 
public finances in this respect would imply an additional debt of about EUR 100 billion. To 
be compatible with the public-sector inter-temporal budget constraints, this would require a 
1.6 percentage point raise in the overall tax rate relative to GDP.
24 FINNISH CENTRE FOR PENSIONS, WORKING PAPERS
6 Concluding remarks
The exceptionally large Finnish baby-boom generations are retiring in the near future. 
The working-age population is already declining because of the population ageing. This is 
expected to continue at an accelerating rate during the next two decades.
We have used the method of generational accounting to evaluate the effects of changing 
demographic structures on the sustainability of public finances. We have demonstrated that 
current debt and deficits are not able to track how maintaining the current fiscal stance will 
affect future  generations. 
Assuming the current structure of public income and expenditure, the sustainability gap 
in public finances is estimated to be 7.2 or 4.6 per cent of GDP, with 3.5 or 5 per cent 
discount rates respectively. These estimates include a mechanical projection of net pension 
liabilities that are not able to take into account the population-driven breaks in benefit 
accrual or the actual indexation formulas of pension benefits. 
The harmonizing of relative public debt levels in the euro area is operationalized here by 
assuming the public debt to be 100 per cent of GDP. This would increase the sustainability 
gap by 1.6 percentage points relative to GDP.
We know that, due to the 2005 pension reform and labour market agreements, both 
contribution and benefit structures are changing. Using actuarial estimates of the impacts 
of the pension reform, the sustainability gap for the whole public sector is estimated to be 
between 5.8 and 3.6 per cent of GDP, depending on the discount factor. However, the impact 
of the pension system alone on the sustainability gap turns out to be slightly negative.
We have separated the contribution of earnings-related pension system to the 
sustainability of public finances from other net transfers systems of general government. 
Assuming the current structure of benefits implies a 1.1 per cent sustainability gap relative 
to GDP. Using actuarial estimates of pension expenditures, we find out that the pension 
system as a whole improves the sustainability of public finances by 0.3 per cent relative 
to GDP. A significant proportion of the difference to the status quo calculation is due to 
the automatic adjustment as a result of the life expectancy coefficient that is reflected only 
in actuarial calculations. The probably unexpected positive impact to the sustainability of 
public finances is due to, on the one hand, the diminishing liabilities of public pensions and, 
on the other hand, to agreed hikes on contribution rates in 2012–2016. 
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Table A2.
Population ('000 persons.).
2010 2011 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100
0-4 302 303 314 305 306 315 313 314 319 319 320
5-9 289 293 314 316 307 317 319 317 322 324 324
10-14 297 293 310 322 313 315 324 321 322 327 328
15-19 332 328 297 322 323 315 325 327 325 330 332
20-24 328 333 308 322 333 325 327 336 333 335 340
25-29 346 345 352 319 343 345 337 347 349 347 352
30-34 339 340 350 333 345 357 349 351 360 358 359
35-39 314 321 360 366 336 359 361 353 363 366 364
40-44 350 339 348 359 343 355 367 360 362 371 369
45-49 377 376 320 365 372 343 366 368 361 371 373
50-54 375 372 349 348 360 345 358 370 363 366 374
55-59 384 384 368 315 359 367 341 363 366 360 370
60-64 402 395 357 336 338 351 339 352 364 359 362
65-69 282 297 356 347 301 347 357 334 357 360 355
70-74 223 239 359 329 316 324 340 331 345 358 354
75-79 180 180 237 313 316 282 331 344 323 347 352
80-84 142 144 164 283 275 276 292 313 307 323 338
85-90 80 82 100 149 216 235 223 270 286 274 300
90+ 35 37 59 83 161 197 227 250 290 305 324
Total 5375 5400 5622 5831 5964 6071 6195 6320 6418 6499 6590
Source: Risku et al. (2012).
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